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Abstract 
Europeanization research often neglects that the implementation of European Union (EU) 
policy results in diverse national outcomes, even if member states comply with EU law. Such 
fine-grained Europeanization patterns have been explored as `gold-plating’ and 
‘customization’. This paper builds and expands on this research to propose a general 
conceptualization and measurement of customization as the changes that provisions of EU 
Directives undergo in their regulatory density and restrictiveness during legal transposition. 
Using unique data on the customization of EU Directive provisions from two policy areas in 
27 countries, our empirical analysis reveals distinct changes in density and restrictiveness, 
pronounced policy-specific and state-level customization patterns. The findings illustrate how 
national customization strategies often follow specific EU regulatory logics in different 
integration contexts. We outline implications for future research on the causes and 
consequences of the inherent diversity of EU implementation regarding dimensions of 
customization, issues of legitimacy and effectiveness. 
 





This paper lays the conceptual basis for systematic comparative research on the 
‘customization’ of European Union (EU) policy, and explores empirical customization 
patterns across member states and policy sectors. Multi-level governance systems calibrate 
legal and economic integration with member state discretion in implementation (Hooghe and 
Marks 2003; Majone 1999; Windhoff-Héritier 2001). In Europeanization research, this 
discretion has mainly been studied in terms of legal compliance (Treib 2014). Yet case study 
evidence suggests that even the compliant implementation of EU policy entails divergent 
national outcomes, frequently as a result of high levels of EU policy ambiguity (e.g., Falkner 
et al. 2005; Shapiro 1999; Versluis 2003). Such differences co-exist with incentives of 
national authorities to comply with the EU Directives (Mastenbroek 2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>; Steunenberg 2007).  
Consider how the EU guarantees that motor vehicles are properly checked and maintained 
while in use (Davidson 2006: 23-25). Council Directive 91/328/EC requires a roadworthiness 
test to be carried out every other year from the car’s fourth year onwards. However, the 
Directive allows for bringing forward the date of the first test, and /or shortening the interval 
between two successive tests. As to 2006, member states complied with this EU rule in 
strikingly diverse ways. Only nine out of 25 countries transposed the EU rule literally. 14 
member states required an earlier first inspection; and ten countries, annual follow-up 
inspections. Car owners face very differing demands, depending on how the respective 
country interprets the EU rule. Research on ‘gold-plating’ and ‘customization’ (Thomann 
2015) scrutinizes such interpretations.  
However, we know remarkably little about the extent, reasons and implications of this fine-
grained diversity in EU implementation (Thomann and Sager 2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
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PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>. This is unfortunate for three 
intertwined reasons. First, national authorities strive to avoid infringement costs while 
choosing the most appropriate strategies to implement EU policies (Steunenberg 2007). These 
strategies have potentially far-reaching implications for how common policy problems are 
resolved in practice in the EU (Scharpf 1997), but go unnoticed by analyzing legal 
compliance. Second, a growing body of evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, 
legal compliance with EU law may be unrelated to its practical application (Falkner et al. 
2005; Versluis 2003, 2007; Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). Therefore, third, studying legal 
compliance without considering adaptations of EU policy to domestic circumstances provides 
an incomplete picture of EU implementation. Yet, conceptual and empirical obstacles have 
hindered the accumulation of systematic, cumulative knowledge on this phenomenon.  
Conceptually, diversity in EU transposition has primarily been linked with issues of non-
compliance and unintended competitive distortions (e.g., Davidson 2006; Jans et al. 2009; 
Morris 2011; Voermans 2009). Thomann (2015) then proposed a more fine-grained 
conceptualization of member states’ customization of the density and restrictiveness of EU 
rules. We build on this earlier work to refine and generalize the customization concept in 
three ways: First, we assume that customization is a phenomenon of vertical regulatory 
change irrespective of (non-)compliance. Second, different aims and manifestations of EU 
law in contexts of positive and negative integration allow for different directions of change 
(Lowi 1972; Scharpf 1997; Vink 2002). Third, we link the concept more explicitly to the 
regulatory output literature to specify the meaning, distinctness and interrelation of the two 
dimensions of change, density and restrictiveness (Adam et al. 2015; Bauer and Knill 2014; 
Knill et al. 2012; Schaffrin et al. 2015).  
Empirically, existing knowledge on these phenomena is still limited to a few case studies of 
selected policies and countries. Without broader comparative studies, the empirical relevance 
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of these insights and their contingency upon selection bias, sectoral and national specificities 
remain unclear (Angelova et al. 2012; Toshkov 2010; Treib 2014). To remedy such biases 
and enable cumulative research, we propose a comprehensive and differentiated scheme to 
measure customization. Applying a subset of the proposed comprehensive conceptualization, 
we ask: What empirical customization patterns do we observe across EU member states and 
policy areas? What is the relationship between different dimensions of customization? We 
scrutinize how 27 member states customize separate provisions from 31 EU Directives from 
two policy areas: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (10) and Environment (21).  
This descriptive and explorative analysis illustrates pronounced policy-specific differences in 
customization that often conform to EU regulatory logics. Furthermore, our study shows that 
the relationship between different dimensions of customization differs across policy areas: the 
number of rules added to or taken away from an EU requirement (customized density) may 
not necessarily tell us about more substantive changes of EU policies through levels of 
restrictiveness in national legislation. Previous research has neglected this distinction. Next, 
we discuss the conceptualization and measurement of customization. After introducing the 
data and methods, we present and discuss our results. We outline theoretical implications and 
trajectories for future research. 
Understanding diversity in multi-level implementation 
Europeanization scholars highlight that the inherent ambiguity of EU rules result in different 
degrees of flexibility and legal uncertainty, leading to different interpretations by member 
states and implying that implementation is dominated by national politics (Schmidt 2008; 
Windhoff-Héritier 2001). Additionally, relatively long-lasting policy, regulatory or 
administrative traditions or styles ‘predispose [countries] to formulate and implement public 
policies in certain distinct ways’ (Adam et al. 2015: 2; Richardson et al. 1982).  
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These concepts resonated in Europeanization research, for example, as ‘worlds of 
compliance’ (Falkner et al. 2005) and non-literal interpretations of EU law (Steunenberg 
2007). Situations when member states go beyond the minimum requirements of EU law have 
been referred to as voluntary over-implementation (Falkner et al. 2005) or gold-plating. Gold-
plating denotes all instances  
‘when implementation goes beyond the minimum necessary to comply with a Directive, 
by: 
 extending the scope, adding in some way to the substantive requirement, or 
 substituting wider domestic legal terms for those used in the Directive; or 
 not taking full advantage of any derogations which keep requirements to a 
minimum (e.g. for certain scales of operation, or specific activities); or 
 providing sanctions, enforcement mechanisms and matters such as burden of proof 
which go beyond the minimum needed (e.g. as a result of picking up the existing 
criminal sanctions in that area); or 
 implementing early, before the date given in the Directive’ (Voermans 2009: 8). 
Only few case studies have addressed this phenomenon, suggesting that countries have 
different approaches toward gold-plating. For example, the UK and Spain are rather literal 
transposers, while the Netherlands sometimes add extra rules (Davidson 2006; Lugt 1999: 
132; Versluis 2003: 17, 19). Tendencies toward over-implementation were found in the power 
sector in Germany and Sweden (Padgett 2003) and regarding social policies in certain old and 
new member states (Falkner et al. 2005). The Netherlands and the UK rarely engage in the 
gold-plating of environmental Directives (Jans et al. 2009; Morris 2011; Voermans 2009). 
The literature often treats gold-plating as a potentially problematic transposition outcome that 
can conflict with compliance (Mastenbroek 2005), associated with red tape ‘resulting in 
unnecessary burdens and competitive disadvantages for domestic businesses’ (Voermans 
2009: 8; see also Davidson 2006). However, this view ‘insufficiently captures the 
implications of member states being part of a multi-level system’ (Schmidt 2008: 299).  
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Thomann (2015: 1370) proposes to think of EU member states as problem-solvers who use 
their leeway to adapt – that is, customize - EU rules to local contexts. While building on the 
gold-plating concept, Thomann (2015) seeks to separate the question of diversity in 
implementation from questions of non-compliance. Therefore, she analyzes only cases of 
correct transposition, where compliant member states go beyond market-correcting EU 
minimal standards. Moreover, she uses the concrete categories that have been fruitfully 
applied to measure changes of regulatory, (re-)distributive, and morality policies (Adam et al. 
2015; Bauer and Knill 2014; Knill et al. 2012; Schaffrin et al. 2015). These changes occur on 
two distinct, although typically interrelated dimensions, namely regarding the amount of rules 
(density) and their content (intensity). Hence, Thomann refines the gold-plating notion by 
accounting for degrees to which the domestic regulations complement an EU rule with more 
or stricter rules than required, and adding these into a combined customization index. Gold-
plating scholars have not clearly distinguished these two change dimensions: some, like 
Versluis (2003: 48), emphasize the ‘adding of extra requirements’ (density), whereas others 
like Lugt (1999: 132) emphasize ‘the laying down of stricter requirements’ (stringency).Yet, 
as we illustrate below, the two dimensions of density and restrictiveness illuminate countries’ 
distinct customization strategies. For example, the UK often added exemptions to EU food 
safety rules (customized density) to maintain regulations that remain as liberal as possible (no 
customized restrictiveness) (Thomann 2015). 
However, previous studies may exaggerate idiosyncratic country differences, by often 
focusing on only one policy area (Treib 2014). Member states could exhibit completely 
different transposition patterns regarding other policies. How exactly these changes occur 
across a wider range of policies and countries remains unclear. To enable systematic 




How do EU rules change during transposition? 
Thomann’s (2015) customization concept presupposes compliant transposition. Note however 
that customization and compliance are two distinct phenomena: the tailoring of rules to local 
circumstances may occur within the scope of discretion granted by an EU rule (compliance), 
or outside (noncompliance). Which is the focus of analysis hinges on the specific research 
interest. Furthermore, the requirement of assessing member states’ compliance first may 
unnecessarily complicate the measurement of customization. Especially ambiguous EU 
provisions do not provide a clear yardstick defining (non-)compliant behavior (Schmidt 
2008), so ‘differences in degree’ may more adequately capture varying responses. But even if 
Directives contain very clear yardsticks, establishing compliance may be a contentious 
process. Confining the analysis to instances of clear-cut compliance may hence result in a loss 
of substantively interesting and important cases of customization 
Furthermore, previous studies refer to situations when member states add to EU provisions. 
Indeed, often domestic rules go beyond the necessary minimum set out by EU rules, especially 
when these aim at positive integration to correct common market problems – such as the 
safety of motor vehicles - through (re)regulation (Vink 2002: 3). While countries have to 
regulate at least as much as the EU prescribes, more ambitious domestic policies – for 
example, more frequent roadworthiness tests - help correct the problem (Jans et al. 2009; 
Scharpf 1996). However, implementers adapt non-standardizing EU rules in differing 
directions, depending on their specific nature and purpose. Particularly in contexts of negative 
integration, EU rules often set out a regulatory limit that member states must not exceed 
(Scharpf 1996). Such rules may serve to avoid restrictions of freedoms or rights or distortions 
of the common market, such as barriers to trade (Vink 2002: 2). Customized domestic rules 
that go below the EU provision, for example lower tariffs than allowed by the EU, can result 
from a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’. Many EU rules also provide a range of acceptable 
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regulation (Steunenberg 2007). For example, EU copyright legislation provides a ‘menu’ of 
exemptions to the limits of reproduction rights of right-holders. National legislators should at 
very least allow ‘temporary acts of reproduction’; beyond the defined range of possible 
exemptions, they also cannot include additional exemptions. However, this ideal-typical 
distinction is often not clear-cut in practice especially for ambiguous EU rules, and does not 
necessarily correlate with positive or negative integration contexts (Scharpf 1997: 522; 
Schmidt 2008). Researchers should therefore always explicitly account for situations in which 
transposing countries both add to or take away from EU rules.  
Finally, the existing toolbox to measure regulatory change highlights the relevance of the two 
dimensions of density and restrictiveness. Schaffrin et al. (2015) differentiate changes in 
policy outputs according to six substantive categories: objectives, scope, integration, budget, 
implementation, and monitoring. Overall customization patterns consist of the extent of the 
changes in these categories of EU rules along the two dimensions of density and 
restrictiveness. An aggregated customization index may add up the values (Thomann 2015) or 
calculate their average, where larger deviations both in positive or negative directions indicate 
more extensive customization levels. Yet distinguishing the two dimensions is not obsolete. 
Although they are logically connected, they refer to distinct aspects of state action and 
illuminate a differentiation of variation in national adaptation strategies that can be insightful 
(Knill et al. 2012). So far, the implications of the distinctness and interrelation of these 
dimensions for understanding the differences in the national transposition of EU legislation 
have not been studied systematically.  
Regulatory density tells us about the formal extent and breadth to which governmental 
activities address a certain policy area. It captures the amount of government activity, as one 
aspect of government size and growth (Bauer and Knill 2014). Customized density refers to 
changes in the degree of regulatory penetration, complexity and internal differentiation (Knill 
8 
 
et al. 2012). Member states may or may not apply optional EU rules, concretize, amend, 
differentiate or specify exemptions to especially broadly formulated EU rules. Often, more 
customized density leads to more restrictive rules. However, sometimes the opposite happens. 
For example, the Directive 2003/4/EC allows member states to refuse public access to 
environmental information if such disclosure would adversely affect intellectual property 
rights. Yet Slovenia specifies that intellectual property rights is not a ground for refusal (less 
restrictive) by adding that the applicant can still review a copy of the requested information 
(more density than the EU provision). 
This example shows that simply counting outputs may not do adequate justice to the content 
of rules, which can be adapted in its intensity. Customized restrictiveness captures how EU 
rules are changed in the scope and level of state intervention to influence target group 
behavior through the extent of the substantial freedom left to policy addressees or the 
generosity of the services or resources provided (Bauer and Knill 2014: 33; Knill et al. 2012: 
430; Schaffrin et al. 2015).1 This dimension reflects different answers of member states to 
‘the question of how to resolve the tension between citizens’ individual freedoms and public 
intervention in order to reach political goals’ (Adam et al. 2015: 19). Depending on the 
importance or significance governments attach to certain measures, domestic rules represent a 
tightening (adds restrictiveness) or loosening (removes restrictiveness) of the EU rules. For 
instance, we have seen that member states added different degrees of restrictiveness to the 
EU’s roadworthiness test requirement to ensure the continued safety of motor vehicles. 
Restrictiveness also captures different state traditions representing deeply institutionalized 
norms specifying the relationship between state and society. Liberal member states generally 
tend to minimally intervene into individual and collective freedom, while others are 
traditionally more interventionist (Adam et al. 2015; Richardson et al. 1982). For example, 
Germany adopts a regulatory strategy to reduce antibiotic resistance through severe 
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restrictions of the use of antibiotics for livestock; conversely, the UK has more lenient rules 
and resorts to private self-regulation and codes of good practice instead (Thomann 2015). 
Increases in density often imply increases in restrictiveness, and vice versa. For instance, 
unlike Directive 2003/35/EC, Latvian law does not limit the scope of the public entitled to 
challenge decisions related to public participation in environmental plans and programs (less 
density). Any natural and legal entity has the right to challenge a respective decision (less 
restrictiveness). Changes in one dimension usually affects the other - but not inherently in the 
same direction. For example, many member states adopted less restrictive conditions for 
acquisition of European Community (EC) long-term resident status than minimally required 
by Directive 2003/109/EC (less restrictiveness). Doing so also entailed defining the categories 
of persons to which these conditions should apply (more density). Nevertheless, member 
states’ transposition outcomes were still more favorable to EU refugees than the EU directive. 
While modifications in density may increase or decrease levels of restrictiveness, they can 
also serve definitional or other purposes, such as concretizing EU rules to enhance legal 
certainty, or integrating the particular concerns of specific interest groups.  
Our main point is that by only focusing on one of the two dimensions or simply merging 
them, one may miss interesting variation (Schaffrin et al. 2015). By analogy, body size and 
weight are also closely interconnected. Nonetheless, only by looking at both can we make 
meaningful comparisons of people’s physical appearance. While their relevance and 
implications for customization is subject to future research, the two dimensions have proven 
useful for describing policy change (Bauer and Knill 2014; Knill et al. 2012) and regulatory 
styles (Adam et al. 2015). 
We thus expand and refine existing concepts and define customization as the changes that EU 
rules undergo in their density and restrictiveness during legal transposition independent from 
assessments of (non-)compliance, along the different categories of policy content (objectives, 
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scope, integration, budget, implementation, and monitoring) and the dimensions of density 
(formal) and restrictiveness (content). This definition includes scenarios of transposing rules 
adding to or removing density or restrictiveness from an EU provision.  
Measuring customization 
Figure A1, online appendix, resumes our proposed conceptualization and measurement of 
customization, which can be adopted partly or fully to fit any specific research setting. We 
apply a subset of the scheme for comparing customization across 27 member states (excluding 
Croatia) and two policy areas: Justice and Home Affairs (10 Directives) and Environment (21 
Directives).  
Data 
The EU Commission sometimes mandates legal experts to craft evaluation or monitoring 
reports that can be used as secondary data sources (Mastenbroek et al. 2016). Our own 
analysis uses conformity reports that share the same structure and contain so-called 
concordance tables (TOCs) that include the Directive provision, the domestic transposition 
measure, and an explicit evaluation of the latter’s level of conformity by a national legal 
expert (see Tables A1-A3, online appendix). While prepared for assessing compliance, these 
expert assessments also provide invaluable information about customization and gold-plating. 
The experts discussed the detailed nature of transposition outcomes and whether these ‘went 
beyond’ the requirements of the Directive.  
Casing 
Domestic regulations of single EU provisions constitute the relevant units of analysis for 
customization (Zhelyazkova 2013). Relevant provisions can be identified by stakeholders and 
experts (Thomann 2015), or as single paragraphs of articles of an EU Directive (Franchino 
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2007: 109). TOCs, as used here, provide a pre-determined separation of articles and sub-
articles. In decentralized countries, customization occurs into both national and sub-national 
legislation. EU rules differ widely in their relevance, length and substantial richness, and 
might hence have to be weighted according to these criteria (Toshkov 2010). To partly 
remedy this issue, this study includes only substantive provisions that required 
implementation and have implications for the national legislation and administrative practice.  
 
Measurement 
Establishing degrees and directions of customization becomes particularly challenging as 
ambiguous EU rules do not establish clear benchmarks (Schmidt 2008). Comparing the 
wording of the EU and transposing provisions is highly time and resource intensive. Instead 
we closely scrutinized and matched the expert evaluations of each provision to the two 
customization dimensions. Our sample hence only includes those state-provision dyads that 
contain explicit expert evaluations about customization. This procedure pragmatically 
addresses the issue of ambiguity, but excludes those provisions that are so broad or unclear 
that evaluating customization is difficult. Conformity assessments hence systematically 
under-represent the actual extent of customization. Expert evaluations with no information 
about customization do not imply equivalent transposition of the EU provisions. The legal 
expert may not have reported minor cases of customization particularly with compliant 
national measures. Hence, the set of cases of customization captured by our analysis is neither 
complete nor representative. Therefore, we can only compare relative customization levels 
across member states and policy areas. Yet we can still explore the relationship between the 
dimensions of density and restrictiveness across member states and issue areas.  
Customized density refers to the amount/ number of rules (policies and/or instruments) that 
are added to or removed from the EU provision (e.g., scope restrictions, concretizations, 
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requirements, conditions, exemptions or specifications added or taken away). In our analysis, 
a domestic transposing rule customizes the Directive provision with more density, if it adds at 
least one element to the latter. Alternatively, a member state may remove density by omitting 
an element of or not transposing an EU provision. We counted the times that an expert 
mentioned an addition to (coded as 1) or an omission (coded as -1) from a specific EU 
provision. Density levels range between -2 and 4.  
Customized restrictiveness occurs along an instrument’s personal, substantive and/or temporal 
scope of application. The personal scope depicts the types of individuals or organizations 
addressed. Customized restrictiveness here indicates that a domestic requirement or restriction 
is valid for a larger target group than the EU provision; or that a freedom, resource or service 
is granted to a smaller set of addressees. The substantive scope refers to the activities 
(behavioral boundaries, cases, constellations, services, resources) covered by an instrument 
(Knill et al. 2012: 429, 431). More restrictive instruments seek to minimize certain behaviors, 
resources or services, or prescribe requirements that considerably limit individual freedom, as 
compared to the EU provision (Adam et al. 2015: 6). In temporal terms, activities, services or 
resources can be restricted to, granted or required for longer or shorter time periods.  
The experts’ evaluations do not distinguish the three levels of scope or assess degrees of 
customized restrictiveness. Instead, we relied on expert assessments that identified 
transposition outcomes as either more restrictive (coded as 1) or less restrictive (-1; hence, 
more favorable to the relevant addresses) than the respective EU provision. For example, the 
experts mentioned that some member states implemented more flexible requirements for 
asylum applications or granted more rights to refugees (e.g., healthcare exceeding emergency 
cases). Other member states requested additional documents for asylum applications or 
further restricted refugees’ rights relative to the JHA Directives. Customized restrictiveness 
amounts to 0, if a provision was neither assessed as more restrictive nor as less restrictive than 
13 
 
the EU provision. The most obvious manifestation of limited customization is literal or 
identical (equivalent) transposition. Note that customization can also result from non-changes 
in domestic policies (Bauer and Knill 2014: 33; Thomann 2015: 1370). In this case, 
differences between the EU and the domestic rule are decisive.  
Results 
Comparing transposition in 27 member states across two policy areas facilitates a 
comprehensive assessment of customization patterns. The JHA Directives define the 
conditions for obtaining a refugee status, the treatment of third-country nationals (TCNs) and 
their families. Many of these often controversial JHA provisions do not allow for more 
restrictive conditions that lower the standards for TCNs or refugees residing in the EU. 
Instead, the environment Directives impose technical requirements regarding, for example, 
emissions trading and environmental assessments of waste management plans. These EU 
environmental rules frequently restrict the behavior of sellers, producers, consumers, etc. and 
allow the member states to impose stricter conditions on domestic products. 
After excluding all missing cases, our data-set contains 750 and 894 observations regarding 
member-state customization of specific EU provisions for JHA and Environment Directives 
respectively2. 14 per cent of the latter 894 provision-state dyads represent subnational 
transposition. As customization hence varied within Belgium, the UK, and some regions in 
Spain, Austria and Finland, the number of observations in environmental policy is higher than 
in JHA policy, despite the lower number of assessed provisions. 
Figure 1 presents the average member-state differences in customized restrictiveness and 
density, separately for JHA and environment EU provisions. The figure indicates significant 
differences in customization across the two policy areas that follow the regulatory logic of the 
EU policy. Most member states transposed JHA provisions less restrictively than prescribed 
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by the EU Directives (74 per cent of the observations). For example, provision 27(2) of 
Directive 2004/83/EC requires that member states treat refugees in the same way as other 
TCNs. Beyond that, countries like Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Sweden 
grant adults with refugee or subsidiary protection status access to the general education 
system under the same conditions as nationals. Denmark is the only exception. Even though it 
generally participates in Schengen legislation, general unwillingness to abandon its restrictive 
immigration policy made Denmark opt out of Amsterdam’s Title IV provisions covering free 
movement, immigration and asylum. While we do not analyze the rationale behind member 
states’ consistent tendencies to transpose immigration Directives less restrictively here, note 
that these decisions were taken prior to the recent refugee crisis. 
 
-- Figure 1 -- 
 
Conversely, the transposition of Environment Directives – typical for positive integration - is 
on average more restrictive for sellers, producers, and the public than what the EU requires 
(63 per cent of all assessed cases). For example, article 9(2) of Directive 2001/18/EC 
mandates member states to make all information about releases of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) publicly available. Italy included an additional obligation for those who 
cultivate GMOs to install adequate cartels clearly indicating the presence of GMOs. 
Slovenia’s flexible transposition of Directive 2003/4/EC is an exception: it loosens the EU’s 
conditions for publicly requesting and receiving environmental data, even if such information 
is protected by intellectual property rights.  
In short, customization appears to be largely driven by the nature of the EU provisions and the 
direction of flexibility they allow for. By contrast, customized density does not exhibit 
pronounced cross-country or policy-specific differences. The member states included 
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additional rules to 28 per cent of the JHA policies, and to 48 per cent of the EU environmental 
provisions. Only very rarely did member states remove rules from Environment Directives.  
Rather than pragmatically focusing only on the density or the restrictiveness dimension or 
simply combining them into one index, we seek to gain a fuller understanding about the 
relationship between these two aspects of customization (see Figure A2, online appendix). We 
find a strong positive relationship between customized restrictiveness and density in the JHA 
area, where restrictiveness is often removed from EU provisions by reducing the amount of 
rules during transposition (97 per cent of all cases reducing density; Pearson r =. 49). To 
facilitate a favorable treatment of refugees, many EU member states chose not to transpose 
exemptions that would impose stricter requirements for obtaining refugee status. Article 17(3) 
of Directive 2004/83/EC, for instance, allows the member states to exclude a TCN or a 
stateless person from being eligible for subsidiary protection, if that person has committed 
one or more crimes prior to admission to the member state. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Romania did not transpose this provision (less density, less restrictiveness). Sometimes, 
density and restrictiveness were also added. While Directive 2001/51/EC provides alternatives 
for financial penalties on carriers transporting illegal immigrants, Poland and Spain even 
introduced all three alternatives (more density), making national provision more restrictive for 
carriers. 
Conversely, there is no significant relationship between density and restrictiveness in the 
Environment sector (Pearson r = -. 04). Whereas member states included additional rules to 
EU provisions, many of them were neither more nor less restrictive than the EU provisions 
(44 per cent of cases with increased density). For example, Flanders (Belgium) transposed 
Directive 2004/3/EC on public access to environmental information by adding that 
‘information officers’ should be designated. This concretization does not necessarily affect 
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levels of restrictions to obtaining access to environmental information. Furthermore, in 73 
percent of the cases in which the member states removed rules from an EU provision, national 
transposition was more, rather than less, restrictive than the EU requirements. For example, 
Directive 2000/76/EC on the incineration of waste specified that the emission limit value for 
nitrogen oxides does not apply to plants only co-incinerating hazardous waste until 1 January 
2007. Hungary, however, did not transpose this exemption (less density). This rendered the 
Hungarian provision more stringent than the EU provision, as the emission limits apply 
immediately. 
In sum, the relationship between restrictiveness and density varies across policy areas. 
Whereas the two dimensions co-vary in JHA policy, adding more rules is not associated with 
more restrictive outcomes in environmental policy. This suggests that information about 
customized density is not sufficient to understand domestic alterations of EU provisions. Even 
in the JHA area the relationship is not perfect. Directive 2001/51/EC, for instance, requires 
that member states ensure penalties to carriers of illegal immigrants. Art. 4(2) specifies that 
this requirement should not interfere with member states' obligations in cases where a third 
country national seeks international protection. However, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania and Slovenia did not transpose this provision (less density), such that 
sanctions are applied regardless of whether asylum is sought or granted (more restrictive to 
carriers). In other cases, density was added to remove restrictiveness. For example, going 
beyond Art. 15 (1)(a) of Directive 2001/55/EC, the Czech legislation explicitly allows family 
reunification of a parent of a minor under 18 (more density, less restrictiveness).  
These findings imply that patterns of customized restrictiveness relatively consistently follow 
the direction of flexibility indicated by EU legislation. Only by specifying ‘what’ – density or 
restrictiveness - was added to or taken away from the EU provision, do we adequately 
understand these interpretations. Thus, Figure 1 reveals differences that remain hidden when 
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combining both dimensions into one customization index, as country-level density and 
restrictiveness could sometimes go in the opposite direction.  
Whereas regulatory change could lead to non-compliance with EU rules, many of the 
instances of customization reported by experts also occurred when transposition was 
compliant (Figure A4, online appendix). We therefore ‘zoom in’ to consider the divergence of 
only those adaptations that met the EU requirements. Figure 2 compares the average levels 
and variation of compliant customized restrictiveness across member states for both policy 
areas (see Figure A5, online appendix for customized density). 
 
-- Figure 2 – 
 
The analysis reveals the considerable diversity of compliant transposition in the EU that 
remains hidden by only distinguishing (non-)compliance. For example, Bulgaria, Austria, the 
Czech Republic and France transposed the EU Environment provisions significantly more 
restrictively than other countries such as Slovenia, Portugal, Latvia and Belgium. Although 
the country differences are less pronounced in the JHA area, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and Romania generally transposed the EU provisions less restrictively relative to most other 
member states. In short, customization patterns do vary significantly across compliant 
member states. Yet national authorities respond differently to EU requirements depending on 
the policy sector. These patterns could indicate that domestic politics matter more for 
customization than country-specific transposition styles. 
Discussion 
In several respects, this study significantly enhances our knowledge about the diversity of 
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transposition outcomes beyond legal compliance in the EU (Schmidt 2008). Building on 
earlier work on gold-plating and Thomann (2015), we have proposed a general but flexible 
conceptualization and measurement scheme that can travel across contexts to guide systematic 
comparative research on the customization of EU Directives. By partly applying the scheme 
to the transposition of EU Directives in two policy areas and 27 member states, this study 
paints the very first comprehensive – although descriptive and broad - picture of 
customization in the EU. Our large-N data-set differentiates neither different substantive 
categories of regulatory change, scopes of application nor degrees of customized 
restrictiveness on a continuous scale (Schaffrin et al. 2015). Relying on expert evaluations 
limited the scope of our results and made it impossible to identify absolute levels of 
customization. An internally more valid analysis requires considerable case knowledge and 
implies relatively high costs for data collection and coding (Adcock and Collier 2001; 
Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Mastenbroek et al. 2016). Future research should 
comprehensively address the analytic challenge of identifying customization in face of legal 
ambiguity. When EU rules are very ambiguous, it might make more sense to compare 
countries' implementation with each other, rather than against an EU template (e.g., Sager et 
al. 2014). The results nonetheless provide preliminary, but solid evidence for the added value 
of analyzing customization. 
Systematically distinguishing customized density and restrictiveness and allowing for 
different directions in which EU rules are changed helped us to illuminate different strategies 
of how member states interpret EU provisions, and the remarkable extent to which these 
adaptations follow sectoral EU regulatory logics. Contrary to previous case studies, our large-
N comparison does not conclusively indicate distinct country-specific styles of gold-plating or 
customizing EU Directives (Falkner et al. 2005; Jans et al. 2009; Morris 2011; Thomann 
2015; Versluis 2003; Voermans 2009). Rather, pronounced policy-specific differences and 
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domestic politics seem to characterize customization patterns – which resonates with 
compliance findings (Steunenberg 2007; Treib 2014). Depending on the nature and purpose of 
EU policies, member states not only add, but sometimes also remove density and/or 
restrictiveness from EU provisions. Accordingly, we find that member states often provide 
less restrictive conditions to TCNs than those defined in JHA Directives. Instead, 
environmental Directives are routinely customized to further restrict the behavior of target 
groups. 
Findings also suggest that member states simultaneously strive to achieve compliance, and 
adapt EU policies to their local contexts. The resulting diversity in compliant transposition 
remains concealed when only looking at legal compliance. Moving beyond legal compliance 
to account for the customization of EU Directives therefore obviously provides substantive 
complementary insights into the diversity of transposition outcomes. But why should we 
bother about this diversity anyway?  
Conclusions: Implications for Europeanization research 
EU implementation patterns beyond legal compliance are to a large extent unknown territory 
(Heidbreder 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>; Treib 2014). Reducing discretionary deviations from centrally 
decided provisions to a control problem neglects bottom-up views emphasizing that local 
implementers’ closeness to the source of the policy problem enhances their ability to achieve 
policy success (Elmore 1979; Knill and Tosun 2012). Member states as problem-solvers with 
an informational advantage may improve EU policies, by adapting them to heterogeneous 
contexts and integrating local policy positions (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 235; Whitford 
2007). This can facilitate context-sensitive solutions of the original policy problem at stake 
and increase the likelihood of effective and broadly accepted policy solutions at the point 
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where the problem is most immediate (Keman 2000; Matland 1995). By introducing a 
bottom-up notion of member state discretion to Europeanization research, research on 
customization helps address salient questions. 
First, rising levels of Euroscepticism and recent events such as Brexit highlight how European 
integration is increasingly perceived as a loss of sovereignty over national policies. The 
customization phenomenon relativizes the extent of this loss of control. It illuminates how 
member states use transposition as an opportunity to modify EU law and regain control. For 
example, Europeanization scholars could inquire how member states make use of different 
dimensions of customization to satisfy domestic interests during implementation (e.g., 
Thomson 2010). They could investigate to what extent more or less restrictive interpretations 
of EU rules enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of EU law ‘on the ground’ (Dörrenbächer 
2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>.  
Second, policy problems are only effectively resolved once EU policies are put into practice 
(Treib 2014). Legal compliance levels have a limited capacity to explain the practical 
application of EU law (Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). Conversely, the customization of EU policy 
is likely to result in different national practical application, enforcement and compliance 
practices (Versluis 2003, 2007). Customization patterns may prove a major missing link for 
gaining a better understanding of the EU’s problem-solving capacity (Scharpf 1997). For 
example, customized restrictiveness and density could have a different impact on practical 
implementation. Studying restrictiveness helps Europeanization scholars to understand the 
freedom of maneuver national laws grant to implementing actors at the stage of practical 
implementation. This should generally influence the extent to which implementing actors can 
accommodate the ambiguous EU directives in a way that also fits local objectives. 
Conversely, adding more rules can complicate the practical implementation process. Whereas 
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such conjectures need to undergo empirical scrutiny, our analyses showed that customized 
restrictiveness and density are distinct yet interrelated aspects of Europeanization processes.  
Finally, the customization concept contributes to the fundamental theoretical debates 
surrounding the use of discretion in general multi-level implementation research (Thomann et 
al. 2016). Our results illustrate the interaction between centralized control and decentralized 
flexibility (Whitford 2007). Studies in comparative politics have long investigated the 
conditions under which national authorities increase or decrease the leeway of domestic 
implementing actors, mostly in the US federal system (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber 
and Shipan 2002). Especially customized restrictiveness could provide a useful yardstick for 
comparing discretionary freedoms across different member states and issue areas.  
Much remains to be done to further explore such fine-grained Europeanization patterns, their 
explanation and implications for the practical application, effectiveness and acceptance of EU 
law. Future research should definitively strive for a more in-depth coding of customization, 
analyze its empirical relevance, and expand these insights to new policy areas. Our 
conceptualization and proposed measurement of customization should help Europeanization 
researchers to cumulatively paint a more complete picture of what Majone (1999: 309) 
famously termed the ‘European experience’. 
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1Additionally, formal intensity depicts domestic enforcement measures, administrative and procedural capacities 
that influence the probability of effectively achieving substantial requirements and the consequentiality of non-
compliant behavior (Adam et al. 2015; Knill et al. 2012). Customization occurs during legal transposition. 
Changes in formal intensity are therefore only captured if the EU Directive explicitly contains respective 
provisions, and measured in their restrictiveness at the legal transposition stage.  
2 The member states vary in the number of EU provisions based on which customization is evaluated. For 
example, customization in Italy was evaluated for 95 Environment provisions, but only for 7 Environment 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Customized restrictiveness and density in 27 member states, both policy areas 
 
Figure 2: customized restrictiveness across member states for compliant national laws 
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